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TAG! Now YOU'RE REALLY "IT"
WHAT PHOTOGRAPHS ON SOCIAL NETWORKING SITES MEAN
FOR THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
Daniel Findlay 1
Now that mobile technological devices like camera phones
pervade our world, allowing people to capture images and scenes
in places and at times never before possible, serious privacy
concerns inevitably arise. The fact that users of social networking
sites, which are growing rapidly in popularity, frequently and
commonly propagate these easily captured images, as well as
traditional ones, throughout cyberspace with startling ease only
serves to bolster such threats to personal privacy. Transforming
threat to reality, law enforcement officers search these online sites
and use the photographs posted to them to help effect significant
legal consequences. Given such staggering new social dynamics,
novel legal questions emerge regarding what privacy expectations
exist in the social conscience of today's technologically hip world
as well as whether traditional privacy formulations and the
guarantees of the Fourth Amendment are adequately equipped to
protect those expectations. In light of the various and harsh
penalties that can arise from users' ability to post and widely
share photographs of others both with and without those people's
knowledge, the government's accessing and use of such
photographs could, under certain circumstances, constitute
constitutionally unwarranted invasions ofprivacy.
I. INTRODUCTION
Henry had a great night ahead of him-he and his college
roommates were throwing a small party with their close friends to
celebrate the start of the college football season. The night did not
' J.D. Candidate, University of North Carolina School of Law, 2010.
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disappoint; Henry grilled some delicious steaks, the home team
won handedly, and the guests enjoyed each other's company and a
surplus of beer and wine deep into the night. Everything was
perfect. Or so Henry thought.
A few days following the party, police knocked on Henry's
door and informed Henry that the state was criminally prosecuting
him for providing alcohol to minors.2 It turns out that one of the
party guests had posted a photograph album from the party on a
social networking website. A fellow student with an axe to grind
saw the photographs of Henry providing drinks to underage
classmates (unbeknownst to Henry) and thereafter tipped off the
police. Unaware that the photographs had even been taken, much
less posted online, Henry felt hurt and betrayed because he was
identified as the lone culprit when other people had performed the
same act. Was the use of such photographs impermissible by law
in any way? Had Henry's privacy been improperly invaded?4 By
whom?
2 Similar actions have been taken or threatened in the education context by
numerous schools across the country. Student users of social networking sites
have been expelled for online criticisms of school officials, written up for
alcohol consumption in on-campus dorms, disciplined for other illegal activities
like under-age drinking, investigated for political statements, as well as
identified and punished for unruly and disorderly behavior. See Nancy Hass, In
Your Facebook.com, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 8, 2006, Education Life Supplement,
Dec. 14, 2005, at 4A, available at http://www.nytimes.con/2006/01/08/
education/edlife/ facebooks.html (last visited Nov. 14, 2008). See also Harvey
Jones & Josd Hiram Soltren, Facebook: Threats to Privacy, MASS. INST. TECH.
at 30 (2005) (discussing the expulsion of Cameron Walker at Fisher College due
to an online group he created to criticize a campus security officer), available at
http://groups.csail.mit.edulmac/classes/6.805/student-papers/fall05-
papers/facebook.pdf (last visited Nov. 14, 2008); Matthew J. Hodge, The Fourth
Amendment and Privacy Issues on the "New" Internet: Facebook.com and
MySpace.com, 31 S. ILL. U. L. J. 95, 95 (2006).
3 See John S. Wilson, MySpace, Your Space, or Our Space? New Frontiers in
Electronic Evidence, 86 OR. L. REv. 1201, 1220 (2007) (stating that social
networking sites, in their most basic formulation, are online communities
consisting of networks of individuals connected and linked through personalized
web "profiles").
4 The notion of a "right to privacy," insofar as such an entitlement operates to
secure the "protection of the person" or the "right to be let alone," was first
postulated in the regime of tort law by preeminent legal scholars Samuel Warren
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The surging role of social networking sites like Facebook 6 and
7 8MySpace, especially among teenagers, tests the boundaries of
and Lewis Brandeis in an 1890 article and has evolved from this famed
beginning. Samuel D. Warren & Lewis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4
HARV. L. REV. 193, 195 (1890). Notably though, it was "[r]ecent inventions and
business methods," including "instantaneous photographs" and "numerous
mechanical devices" which first "call[ed] attention to the next step" in securing
or at least better ensuring personal protection. Id. The circumstances which
prompt a discussion of the right to privacy as it exists (or perhaps should exist)
amid today's novel technological landscape appear to mirror those triggering
circumstances that led to the discussion of such a right's existence originally.
See also Patricia Sanchez Abril, Recasting Privacy Torts In A Spaceless World,
21 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 1, 11 (2007).
5 With respect to direct liability, the social networking site itself is absolved
from any exposure under the Communications Decency Act, provided that: (1)
the information in question originated independently from a user; and (2) the site
executed no editorial or heightened review function; see 47 U.S.C. § 30(c)(1)
(1996). See also Doe v. Friendfinder Network, Inc., 540 F. Supp. 2d 288, 293
(D.N.H. 2008), reconsideration denied by Doe v. Friendfinder Network, Inc.,
2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38177 (D.N.H. 2008) ("Under the Communications
Decency Act ("CDA") . . . '[n]o provider or user of an interactive computer
service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided
by another information content provider' . . .").
6 Facebook, http://www.facebook.com (last visited Nov. 14, 2008) (on file
with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology). The most popular
social networking site worldwide, grouping users into online communities where
they can associate with "friends," publish customized personal information, and
communicate with other users. See Wilson, supra note 3, at 1204; Hodge, supra
note 2, at 98-99.
7 MySpace, http://www.myspace.com (last visited Nov. 14, 2008) (on file
with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology). The second most
popular social networking site, performing the same basic functions as
Facebook. See Kenneth Corbin, Facebook Tops MySpace as Social Sites
Globalize, INTERNETNEWS.COM, Aug. 14, 2008, http://www.internetnews.com/
webcontent/article.php/3765406/Facebook+Tops+MySpace+as+Social+Sites+G
lobalize.htm(citing comScore metrics analysis) (last visited Nov. 14, 2008) (on
file the with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology); Hodge, supra
note 2, at 98-99.
8 See Abril, supra note 4, at 13 (citing recent poll by the Pew Internet Project,
which found that 55 percent of Internet users from ages twelve to seventeen
have profiles on online networking websites); Amanda Lenhart & Mary
Madden, Teens, Privacy & Online Social Networks, PEW INTERNET &
AMERICAN LIFE PROJECT, at ii (2007), available at http://www.pewinternet
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traditional privacy recognitions on multiple fronts.9 New concerns
regarding which privacy expectations deserve protection emerge as
it becomes easier for social network users to upload photographs of
others without their knowledge, and sometimes without triggering
any mechanism to put them on notice. Combined with the startling
ease with which such photographs are accessed by the public
(including law enforcement officers and public school officials),
questions abound as to where those protections may be found in
the law. Specifically, the pervasive practice of posting
photographs on online networking sites raises questions regarding
circumstances where state actors access and use such photographs
without warrants and whether those circumstances violate a
person's right to privacy. 0
.org/pdfs/PIPTeensPrivacySNSReportFinal.pdf (last visited Nov. 16,
2008) (on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology).
9 See Catherine Rampell, What Facebook Knows That You Don't, WASH.
POST, Feb. 23, 2008, at A15, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2008/02/22/AR2008022202630.html (last visited Nov. 16,
2008); Chris Soghoian, Exclusive: The Next Facebook Privacy Scandal, CNET
News, Jan. 23, 2008, http://news.cnet.com/8301-13739_3-9854409-46.html (last
visited Nov. 14, 2008) (on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law &
Technology); Jeffery R. Young, Study Raises New Privacy Concerns About
Facebook, THE CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC., Feb. 4, 2008, available at
http://chronicle.com/free/2008/02/1489n.htm (last visited Nov. 14, 2008) (on
file with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology); Associated Press,
Facebook Feature Draws Privacy Concerns, MSNBC.COM, Sept. 8, 2006,
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/14728756/ (on file with the North Carolina
Journal of Law & Technology). See generally Harvey Jones & Jos6 Hiram
Soltren, Facebook: Threats to Privacy, MASS. INST. TECH. at 1-41 (2005),
available at http://groups.csail.mit.edu/mac/classes/6.805/student-papers/fall05-
papers/facebook.pdf (last visited Nov. 14, 2008); Criticism of Facebook:
Privacy Concerns, Wikipedia-The Free Encyclopedia, http://en.wikipedia
.org/wiki/Criticism of Facebook#Privacyconcerns (last visited Nov. 17,
2008) (on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology).
10 In a string of cases spanning most of the 20th century, the United States
Supreme Court gradually illuminated areas of "privacy rights" or "liberty
interests" that it controversially found embedded in the Constitution-with
justifications ranging from "penumbras" and "emanations" of the Bill of Rights
to a vague "zone of privacy" as well as Ninth and Fourteenth Amendment
rationalizations. See generally Exploring Constitutional Conflicts: The Right of
Privacy, University of Missouri-Kansas City School of Law, http://www.law
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Contemporary standards for defining privacy should be crafted
to reflect an increasingly integrated and interactive world where
people often voluntarily engage in situations with fewer barriers
protecting their privacy. In other words, what the reasonable
person today considers private requires new or evolved paradigms.
Moreover, advancements in technology-such as pocket-sized
digital cameras, camera phones, 1 and social networking sites 2
propel both the taking and dissemination of photographs to new
realms. This makes traditional protection mechanisms and means
of controlling privacy outdated in many respects. These real-world
developments require a nuanced inspection of the Fourth
Amendment's application to such a context. In light of the ways
people currently use social networking websites and the
expectations they reasonably attach to their actions therein, certain
actions by government officers in accessing photographs could
constitute unconstitutional searches and seizures violating the right
to privacy secured by the Fourth Amendment.
This Recent Development explores and highlights how the
scope and usage patterns of photographs posted on social
networking sites challenge the existing notions of privacy
expectations within the confines of the Fourth Amendment and
government searches and seizures. First, Part II highlights the
recent and expansive use of photographs gathered from social
networking sites in legal contexts and details how these trends
.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/conlaw/rightofprivacy.html (last visited Oct.
15, 2008) (on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology).
" See Jeremy Cothran, Athletes' 'Images' Always at Risk: Nowhere to Hide
in this High-Tech Age, THE STAR-LEDGER, Sept. 13, 2008, at Sports 1,
http://www.nj.com/mets/index.ssf/2008/09/athletes images-always-at risk.html
(quoting Derek Jeter regarding the pervasiveness and tricky issues posed by
camera phones: "Now everyone's got it in a phone, so everywhere you go,
everything you do, you've just got to have the philosophy or the mind-set that
they're watching") (last visited Oct. 13, 2008) (on file with the North Carolina
Journal of Law & Technology).
12 Facebook, http://www.facebook.com (last visited Nov. 14, 2008) (on file
with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology); MySpace, http://www.
myspace.com (last visited Nov. 14, 2008) (on file with the North Carolina
Journal of Law & Technology).
N.C. J.L. & TECH.
present unprecedented issues that may not comfortably fit in
existing Fourth Amendment paradigms. Next, Part III outlines
how photographs are used on social networking sites and explains
what user-enabled privacy protections currently exist as well as
ones that do not. Part IV provides a brief overview of the Fourth
Amendment and the privacy entitlements possibly secured therein.
Then, Part V examines traditional Fourth Amendment privacy law
conceptions as they apply to the current social networking site
dynamics and discusses how the new environment created by these
online communities forces new considerations as to what types of
searches are constitutionally warranted. Finally, Part VI offers a
reasoned forecast about the future of privacy law generally in a
digital social networking world.
II. RECENT FORAYS FOR PHOTOGRAPHS POSTED TO SOCIAL
NETWORKING SITES
While the straightforward use of online photographs' 3 to
implicate a guilty party is itself a recent innovation in the legal
world,14 it has already spurred other developments. Numerous
new applications of photographs are arising throughout the various
arenas of law, all of which raise questions about potential
violations of rational privacy expectations or possible extensions of
such expectations.' 5 Further enriching the complexity of the issue
13 Social networking sites also allow the posting of videos, a medium which
presents largely identical legal issues as does the posting of photographs (while
also possibly adding interesting and important contextual information). See
Facebook: Videos, http://www.facebook.com/help.php?ref-pf (last visited Nov.
17, 2008) (on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology).
14 See Nancy Hass, In Your Facebook.com, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 8, 2006,
Education Life Supplement, at 4A (pointing out how photographs have been
used to directly legally implicate their subjects in various settings) available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/01/08/education/edlife/facebooks.html (last
visited Nov. 14, 2008).
15 In addition to this Recent Development's specific Fourth Amendment
search-and-seizure concerns, the evolving social dynamic may present possible
tort claims, along with attaching liability, for users posting and tagging online
photographs; as well as possible Bivens and/or 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims against
government actors. See Patricia Sanchez Abril, Recasting Privacy Torts in a
Spaceless World, 21 HARv. J. LAW & TECH. 1 (2007).
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is the fact that the subject matter here involves photographs,16
which are undeniably accurate depictions of a singular moment in
time (assuming no digital alteration occurred). The coalescence of
these issues ignites a fascinating inquiry as to whether a law
officer's access, without a warrant, of photographs posted to a
social networking site ever unlawfully intrudes on a recognizable
user right to privacy.
Photographs taken from Facebook played an important role in
a recent Rhode Island criminal case. There, the prosecutor
handling a drunken-driving case presented pictures of the
defendant at a party just two weeks after the accident.17 Though
the defendant himself was not responsible for posting the
photographs,' 8 the prosecutor introduced a picture of the defendant
dressed like a prisoner with a shirt that read "Jail Bird" to paint the
defendant as an "unrepentant partier who lived it up while his
victim recovered in the hospital."' 9 The judge in the case agreed,
swayed in part by the pictures, which he characterized as
20 21depraved.20 He sentenced the defendant to two years in prison.
The judge stated, "I did feel that gave me some indication of how
that young man was feeling a short time after a near-fatal accident,
that he thought it was appropriate to joke and mock about the
possibility of going to prison.' 2
16 Although the instant analysis specifically focuses on the use of photographs,
the creation of party "invitations" on social networking sites has been introduced
in a criminal case as evidence that the party organizers knowingly provided
underage guests with alcohol. See State v. Tonelli, 749 N.W.2d 689, 690 (Iowa
2008), reh'g denied by State v. Tonelli, 2008 Iowa Sup. LEXIS 88 (Iowa June
10, 2008).
1 Associated Press, Unrepentant on Facebook? Expect Jail Time, CNN.COM,
July 18, 2008, http://www.cnn.com/2008/CRIME/07/18/facebook.evidence.ap/
index.html (on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology).
8 Id. Another victim in the crash saw the photographs on the defendant's
Facebook page and provided them to prosecutors. Id.
19 Id.
20 id
21 id
22 id
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Drunk-driving defendants in California suffered similar
sentencing fates due to photographs that depicted them in an
embarrassing light, making it difficult for them to convince the
judges that they were sufficiently remorseful or suggest that their
illegal actions were not aberrations. 23  Photographs posted to
online social communities are being applied in a variety of other
legal contexts as well.24 Those contexts involving police
23 Id.
24 One of the more interesting examples of this phenomenon took place
recently in North Carolina where a personal injury plaintiff seeking ten million
dollars in damages in a negligence suit received a judgment for absolutely
nothing following a cross-examination in which photographs from her own
MySpace page were used to poke holes in her case. Oldham v. Jackson and
Smith Excavating, Inc. No. 06-CVS-642 (Chatham County Super. Ct., June 11,
2008); see also Guy Loranger, MySpace Photographs Used Against North
Carolina Injury Plaintiff, N.C. LAW. WKLY., June 30, 2008, at 1. The jury
delivered the verdict after just thirty minutes of deliberation. Photographs of the
party-going plaintiff presented forceful evidence against her claims that the
brain injury she suffered had so severely impacted her life and curtailed her
activities that she could never achieve her dream of becoming a teacher. See
Loranger, supra. As the defense attorney in that case said, the photographs
"took away the sympathy effect." Id. In large part because of the clarity,
forcefulness and irrefutability inherently provided by such photographs,
litigators are increasingly using data-mining from social networking sites in
depositions and for witness and litigant testimony.
A Delaware family court case illuminates possible extensions to the theme. In
that case, photographs posted to an online social networking site showing a
teenage boy and friends drinking at the boy's mother's house were introduced
by the boy's father as evidence of improper supervision by the mother in an
attempt to establish her lack of fitness as a parent. See N.P. v. J.P., 2008 Del.
Fam. Ct. LEXIS 45 (Del. Fam. Ct. Jan. 30, 2008). Social networking websites
and information posted on the Internet have also been used as a key part of the
process for vetting jurors. See Julie Kay, Social Networking Sites Help Vet
Jurors, THE NAT'L L.J., Aug. 13, 2008, available at http://www.law
.com/jsp/legaltechnology/pubArticleLT.jsp?id=1202423725315&rss=ltn (last
visited Nov. 14, 2008) (on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law &
Technology) (referencing U.S. v. Hassoun, No. 0:04-cr-60001 (S.D. Fla. 2006),
available at, http://www.pegc.us/archive/US vPadilla/def replyl 20061201
.pdf) (last visited Nov. 14, 2008)) as an instance where a juror was dismissed
after an online discovery showed she had lied on her jury questionnaire. Jury
consultants are increasingly using these methods because "such sites are a
treasure trove of information about potential and seated jurors that can be used
178 [VOL. 10: 171
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investigations of potential law breakers 25 and school officials
monitoring the activities of their students26 and their student
athleteS27  most directly implicate the Fourth Amendment.
Inevitably, such scenarios resound with privacy implications. It is
a practical reality in the digital age, as one Illinois police officer
stated, that "[i]f you don't want it to be my business, then don't
post it?" 28  Or, alternatively, might the reach of the Fourth
Amendment operate to bar certain government uses of online
photographs, at least when those photographs are not posted by
their subjects?
in picking the right jurors, bouncing potential jurors and even influencing jurors
through the trial and in closing arguments." Kay, supra.
25 See Stephanie Perry, Can Facebook Lead to Your Arrest?, THE DAILY FREE
PRESS-BOSTON UNIv., Jan. 25, 2006, cached version from Sept. 20, 2008,
available at, Google search for "Can Facebook Lead to Your Arrest," or
available at, http://74.125.45.104/search?q=cache:PbKJ2CGQ5EwJ:www.
dailyfreepress.com/media/paper87/news/2006/01/25/News/Can-Facebook.Lead
.To.Your.Arrest-1504305.shtml+Can+Facebook+lead+to+your+arrest&hl
=en&ct-clnk&cd=2&gl-us&client-firefox-a (discussing various incidents of
police utilizing online photographs to aid their investigations) (last visited Oct.
14, 2008) (on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology). See
generally Nancy Hass, In Your Facebook.com, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 8, 2006,
Education Life Supplement at 4A (recounting, among other observations, a
humorous anecdote where students suspected campus police were monitoring
them online and staged a fake party, which the police came to break up),
available at http://www.nytimes
.com/2006/01/08/education/edlife/facebooks.html (last visited Nov. 14, 2008).
26 See Lisa Guernsey, Picture Your Name Here, N.Y. TIMES, July 27, 2008,
Tech Support at 6 (mentioning a high school principal who saw online photos of
partying students, and doled out punishment to those who were holding beer
bottles but not to those with red plastic cups), available at http://www.nytimes
.comi/2008/07/27/education/edlife/27facebook-innovation.html (last visited Nov.
14, 2008).
27 Jimmy Greenfield & David Haugh, When What Happens on MySpace
Doesn't Stay on MySpace, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 28, 2006, at 7 (noting a 10-day,
delete-your-facebook-account-or-else policy issued to athletes at Florida State
University and a mass email warning sent to athletes at Baylor).
28 id
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III. SOCIAL NETWORKING SITES
Social networking sites link networks of individuals into online
communities through personalized web "profiles."29 Users
customize and publish their profiles, which often include the
ability to "post" or "upload" written content, photographs, videos,
music, and more. 30  Frequently, users communicate with each
other via various messaging systems (with such communications
occurring either privately or publicly), establish online "friend"
networks,31 and join groups based on common interests.32
Though these social networks are relatively new, 33 their growth
has been astronomical. In June 2008, Facebook became the most
widely used social networking site in the world, with
approximately 132 million visitors worldwide. 34 Considering that
this figure represents a 153 percent increase from the previous
year,35 the potential for continued growth appears robust to say the
least.36 MySpace, the industry leader as of 200737 (and still the
29 John S. Wilson, MySpace, Your Space, or Our Space? New Frontiers in
Electronic Evidence, 86 OR. L. REv. 1201, 1220 (2007).
30id
31 See id at 1220 n.90 (using quotations around "friend" denotes the fact that
many users have little to no contact with some of their online "friends").
32 Id. at 1220.
3 Mark Zuckerburg launched Facebook in February 2004, while MySpace
founders Tom Anderson and Chris DeWolfe created their site in July 2003. Id.
at 1221-22.
34 Kenneth Corbin, Facebook Tops MySpace as Social Sites Globalize,
INTERNETNEWS.COM, Aug. 14, 2008, http://www.internetnews.com/webcontent
/article.php/3765406/Facebook+Tops+MySpace+as+Social+Sites+Globalize
.htm) (citing comScore metrics analysis) (last visited Oct. 14, 2008) (on file with
the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology).
36 Triston McIntyre, Facebook Usage Down, MySpace Still Top Dog,
BLORGE, May 20, 2008, http://tech.blorge.com/Structure:%20/2008/05/20/
facebook-usage-down-myspace-still-top-dog/ (reasoning that Facebook's image
as "hipper" and "younger" as well as its substantial base of college-aged users
explains why it is considered a "more valuable entity") (last visited Nov. 14,
2008) (on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology).
37 Doe v. MySpace, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 2d 843, 845 (W.D. Tex. 2007),
affirmed by Doe v. MySpace, Inc., 528 F.3d 413 (5th Cir. 2008), writ of cert.
deniedby Doe v. MySpace, Inc., 2008 U.S. LEXIS 8516 (U.S. Nov. 17, 2008).
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narrow leader in the United States 38 ), counted more than 117
million global users as of June 2008.39 In fact, social networking
sites grew by twenty-five percent collectively over the past year,4
and both MySpace and Facebook currently rank in the top five
most popular sites overall in the United States, putting them
squarely among Internet heavyweights Yahoo! and Google. 1 This
enormous number of users, combined with their heavy usage,42
shows the pervasiveness of such sites as part of modem-day life.
A. Posting Photographs Online
The photograph-posting process is a relatively simple
endeavor. On Facebook,43 for example, users simply login to the
site, perform a one-time installation of a small enabling
application, enter the folder directory on their computer where the
photographs they want to upload are stored, and click upload.4 At
that point, the photographs are technically "online," though they
may not be "live" in the sense that anyone is able to view them
since the links that make the photographs readily accessible are not
automatically formed. That is because Facebook allows users to
38 Top Sites: United States, ALEXA, http://www.alexa.com/site/ds/topsites?
cc=US&ts mode=country&lang=none (last visited Nov. 14, 2008) (on file with
the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology).
39 Corbin, supra note 34.
40 id.
41 Top Sites, supra note 38.
42 According to Chris Hughes, a spokesman for Facebook, nearly three-
quarters of the site's users sign on at least once every twenty-four hours, and the
average user signs on six times a day. See Nancy Hass, In Your Facebook.com,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 8, 2006, Education Life Supplement at 4A, available at
http://www .nytimes.com/2006/01/08/education/edlife/facebooks.html.
43 "According to comScore, Facebook has the No. I photo service on the
Web-thanks in part to its tagging feature . . . ." Lisa Guernsey, Picture Your
Name Here, N.Y. TIMES, July 27, 2008, Tech Support at 6, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/27/education/edlife/27facebook-
innovation.html.
44 See Facebook: Help Center, http://www.facebook.com/help/seeall.php?
facebook&id-412 (click on "How do I add photos and create an album?") (last
visited Nov. 18, 2008) (on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law &
Technology).
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restrict (or at least attempt to restrict) the audiences that are
permitted access to their 4photographs via individual, user-
controlled privacy settings. But many users do not avail
themselves of these privacy controls.46 Further complicating the
issue, even Facebook asserts that "no security measures are perfect
or impenetrable ... [and that Facebook] cannot and do[es] not
guarantee that User Content you post on the Site will not be
viewed by unauthorized persons." 47
B. Tagging Photographs Online
As another component of the photograph-posting process, users
"tag," or place an identifying electronic marker, over people
captured in the photographs. This labeling function allows viewers
of the photographs to discover the identities of the people in the
picture.48 Additionally, Facebook provides the following four
possible privacy settings that users can choose for each photograph
album:
45 See Facebook: Help Center, http://www.facebook.com/help.php (click on
"Privacy") (last visited Oct. 7, 2008) (on file with the North Carolina Journal of
Law & Technology); see also Hodge, supra note 2, at 98-99 (detailing the
different privacy options for MySpace and Facebook).
46 See Amanda Lenhart & Mary Madden, Teens, Privacy & Online Social
Networks, PEW INTERNET & AMERICAN LIFE PROJECT, ii (2007) (reporting that
more than a third of teen Internet users do not limit their profiles), available at
http://www.pewintemet.org/pdfs/PIPTeensPrivacySNSReport Final.pdf
(last visited Nov. 16, 2008) (on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law &
Technology).
47 Facebook: Privacy Policy, http://www.facebook.com/policy.php (last
visited Nov. 16, 2008) (on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law &
Technology).
48 In recent months, Facebook changed its photograph-tagging system to allow
certain viewers of online albums to tag the subjects of the photographs they
access-a practice referred to as "community tagging." This marked a shift
from the previous system, in which the original uploader made the ultimate
decision about who was tagged. Under the previous system, users were able to
suggest people that should be tagged, but the original uploader had to confirm
before links would be formed. Again, while not the precise focus of this Recent
Development, such a change, in addition to implicating privacy expectations,
may drastically expand who could potentially be liable for any harms resulting
from tagging, since the number of people who can perform such an action on a
given photograph has greatly increased.
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1. Everyone: your friends and people on your networks can see
photos in this album. Additionally, if you tag anyone in this album, the
friends of the people you tag will be able to see the photos in which
their friends are tagged regardless of which network they are on.
2. All my networks and all my friends: only the people on your
networks and your friends will be allowed to see the photos in this
album.
3. Some of my networks and all my friends: you can select which of
your networks have permission to see the photos in this album. All of
your friends will have permission to see the photos, regardless of their
networks.
4. Only my friends: only your friends can see this album. These
options are specific to each album, so different levels of privacy can be
selected for different types of photos.49
These privacy settings-as well as the tagging process-are
substantial measures which help curb violations of privacy. For
example, the tagging process includes the vital component of
notice. When a Facebook user is tagged, the tagged individual is
notified of the action via email or other chosen means and can
view the photograph and de-tag himself or herself. While this type
of notice is offered, the fact that the link to the photograph forms
immediately (and may be actively disseminated or "pushed" to
other users by an automated Facebook "news-feed" process) means
that the tagged individual is not granted any grace period for
49 Facebook: Help Center, http://www.facebook.com/help/seeall.php?
facebook&id-412 (click on "Who can see my photos?") (last visited Oct. 13,
2008) (on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology). Beyond
these general settings, the uploader has the ability to share any given photograph
(or album) with non-facebook users via a universal hyperlink. See Facebook:
Help Center, http://www.facebook.com/help/seeall.php?facebook&id=412
(click on "How do I share my albums with people who do not use Facebook?")
(last visited Nov. 14, 2008) (stating bluntly and opening the door to broad
privacy concerns: "this link will always work, even if you add photos or change
your album privacy settings") (on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law &
Technology). Alternatively, users may limit the photos they post to their profile
to their exclusive viewing or may completely deny access to specific, known
individuals. See Facebook: Help Center, http://www.facebook.com/help/
seeall.php?facebook&id=419 (click on "How do I restrict specific content from
specific people?") (last visited Nov. 18, 2008) (on file with the North Carolina
Journal of Law & Technology).
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review. Thus, the subject is fully exposed to unrestrained potential
invasions of privacy-including the prying eyes of law
enforcement-until he or she receives the notifying email. While
the action of de-tagging makes the photograph less discoverable
with respect to the formerly tagged individual (because the
photograph no longer appears linked in his or her profile), the
photograph still remains online, and the person, while no longer
identifiable by electronic marking information, continues to be at
risk of independent visual verification by individual users.50 What
this means in reality is that one user may choose to de-tag himself
or herself from a given picture because of privacy concerns, but if
other people in the photograph remain tagged, the de-tagged
individual is still subject to a high likelihood of unwanted
publicity,5 1 including possible exposure to probing government
agents. Thus, while de-tagging offers some remedial protection,
the protection is incomplete. A de-tagged individual remains in a
predicament similar to that of a person captured in a photograph
but never tagged-the lone advantage being that the once-tagged
individual at least has knowledge of the photograph's existence
and publication, whereas the never-tagged individual likely does
not.
so Individuals can also be identified by plain text input by the original
uploader, which does not create a link or trigger the automated sharing process,
but also prevents the de-tagging process.
51 Put differently, while an "incriminating" (used loosely) or "embarrassing"
photograph may be removed from the implicated party's profile, the same
people likely to discover and view it in the first place still have a good chance of
discovering the photograph, whether through the profiles of the other tagged
members or through other various means. Moreover, these viewers are often
acquaintances of the de-tagged individual or at least familiar with him or her,
and thus, the de-tagging action fails in its objective to prevent identification.
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Though it receives as many as ten thousand complaints a day, 52
Facebook offers little help to users who may find themselves in
such a scenario, claiming in its privacy policy that the best option
for such circumstances is to ask the person who posted the
photograph to remove it.53  Asserting that "Facebook CANNOT
make people remove photos that do not violate [Facebook's]
Terms of Use," 54 Facebook instead instructs dissatisfied users to
avail themselves of the mercy of the original posters, who "should
be respectful enough to remove unwanted photos."55 In an ideal
world, such rhetoric would put an end to the issue, but in the event
the original poster proves uncooperative, problematic search and
seizure issues arise.
IV. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
The Fourth Amendment states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 6
Historically, the amendment was read literally, so that any
constitutional violation required "an official search and seizure of
his person, or such a seizure of his . . . tangible material effects, or
52 Karen Matthews, Facebook, New York Attorney General Reach Agreement
on Obscenity Safeguards, ASSOCIATED PRESs, Oct. 16, 2007 (cached version
from Oct. 17, 2007 available via Google search for "Facebook, New York
attorney general reach agreement on obscenity safeguards" or at http://74.125.
45.104/search?q=cache:tlSiWTo6CPoJ:news.public.findlaw.com/ap/o/51/10-16-
2007/f93eOOO982ccce7e.html+Facebook,+New+York+attorney+general+reach+
agreement+on+obscenity+safeguards&hl=en&ct-clnk&cd= 1 &gl=us (last
visited Nov. 17, 2008) (on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law &
Technology).
53 Facebook: Help Center, http://www.facebook.com/help/seeall.php?
facebook&id=412 (click on "There's a photo of me on Facebook that I want
taken down.") (last visited Oct. 13, 2008) (on file with the North Carolina
Journal of Law & Technology).
54 d
56 U.S. CONST. amend IV.
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an actual physical invasion ... for the purpose of making a
seizure."" However, in 1967, partially owing to new factual
paradigms brought about by changing societal circumstances," the
United States Supreme Court issued a landmark decision in Katz v.
United States.59 Critically, the Court recast the Fourth Amendment
in recognition that "the Fourth Amendment protects people, not
places."o6 Katz, along with its progeny, came to establish a two-
step reasonableness standard as the analytical tool for evaluating
Fourth Amendment privacy protections in the context of searches
and seizures.6 1 Thus, for constitutional safeguards to exist, "a
person [must first] have exhibited an actual (subjective)
expectation of privacy" 62 and, second, "the expectation [must] be
one that society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable.'
63
-
If both those elements are satisfied, "the police must acquire a
warrant, with its corresponding probable cause requirement, to
search the protected area or information in order comply with the
Fourth Amendment."' Improperly collected evidence may be
subject to the "exclusionary rule" and prove inadmissible.6 ' These
expectations have generally proven difficult to analyze in the age
of the Internet. Courts have struggled to analogize the scenarios
presented by cyberspace to considerations typically involved in
determining traditional privacy expectations.66 Even before the
explosion of social networking sites and the accompanying
photograph-posting phenomenon, courts had recognized that "[t]he
advent of the electronic age and ... the development of desktop
5 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 466 (1928).
58 See id. at 472-75 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
" 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (including Justice Harlan's concurrence, supra note
61, which in many ways has come to shape and drive the current law of
privacy).
6 0 Id. at 351.
61 Hodge, supra note 2, at 100.
62 Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
63 Id.
6 See generally Hodge, supra note 2 (noting as well that exceptions to this
requirement exist in certain circumstances).
65 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961) ("all evidence obtained by
searches and seizures in violation of the Constitution is ... inadmissible").
66 See Hodge, supra note 2, at 101-06.
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computers . .. go beyond the established categories of
constitutional doctrine. Analogies to other physical objects, such
as dressers or file cabinets, do not often inform the situations we
now face as judges when applying search and seizure law.""7
As a result, there is some inconsistency with regard to how
courts have defined both subjective and objective privacy
expectations in the digital age." On one hand, the understanding
exists that "a person has no legitimate expectation of privacy in
information he voluntarily turns over to third parties."69
Accordingly, a person "takes the risk, in revealing his affairs to
another, that the information will be conveyed by that person to the
Government.""o Standing in contrast is the idea that "what [a
person] seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to
the public, may be constitutionally protected."" Thus, it is
unsurprising that privacy rights remain unsettled, especially as they
relate to information contained on social networking websites,
such as photographs posted by people other than their subjects.
Email presents perhaps the most relative comparison to such
information (though the parallel is somewhat forced and certainly
not direct), and courts have reached conflicting decisions in
determining whether reasonable privacy expectations attach to
certain email communications.72 Nevertheless, society seems
interested in securing some privacy protections in the digital age;
federal legislation and state court rulings have sought to expand
privacy expectations." In turn, this leads to the suggestion that, in
light of society's contemporary working dynamics, general
conceptions of what is considered "private" may also require
expansion, significant alteration, or at the very least, clarification.
67 United States v. Walser, 275 F.3d 981, 986 (10th Cir. 2001).
68 See Hodge, supra note 2, at 102-06.
69 Smith v. Md., 442 U.S. 735, 743 (1979).
70 United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976).
71 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
72 See Hodge, supra note 2, at 104-06.
7 Id. at 103-04.
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V. EXISTING FOURTH AMENDMENT PRIVACY FORMULATIONS
The foremost concern of this Recent Development centers on
the ability of social networking website users to post and widely
share photographs of other users with and without their knowledge
and whether the law enforcement agents or school officials who
access or use these photographs without a warrant violate the
Fourth Amendment's prohibition against illegal searches and
seizures. The pristine ability of photographs to capture private
moments in people's lives and then immediately communicate
them to any and all viewers of their contents distinctly heightens
the privacy issues involved. Thus, determining precisely how the
unique environment created by the digital age fares under Katz's
two-prong privacy expectation test becomes critical.
A. Subjective Expectation ofPrivacy
In the context of photographs posted to social networking
communities, this subjunctive Katz inquiry requires determination
of whether the subject of any given posted photograph has a
subjective expectation of privacy in that particular photograph.
Making such a determination necessarily incorporates a myriad of
factors. Key considerations would include: whether the
photograph's subject even has knowledge of the photograph's
existence, where the photograph was taken, who took the
photograph, who posted the photograph, what device was used,
what activities are documented in the photograph, why was the
photograph taken, and the online privacy settings of both the
uploader and the subject. Though these factors would unavoidably
vary from photograph to photograph and person to person, it is not
hard to conceive a variety of situations in which the necessary
subjective expectation could exist for a given social network user.
In other words, many hypothetical as well as real instances exist in
which a given photograph subject could sufficiently seek to
preserve the photograph as something private, 74 thus securing
constitutional protection against warrant-less searches.
74 See Hodge, supra note 2, at 106.
7 See Katz, 389 U.S. at 351.
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In fact, that exact conclusion seems follows naturally given the
way many people interact in online communities. Many users
limit their profiles, 76 carefully choose which "friends"77 and
networks to add, and meticulously de-tag themselves from posted
photographs. 8 Such actions designed to limit and restrict the
availability of information to certain groups inherently display a
user's intent to secure privacy, and it takes no great leap of logic to
assume that users, having taken such actions, do in fact expect that
such privacy exists. 79 Furthermore, these precautions to protect
and ensure privacy, though taken in an arguably public medium,
engender a collective understanding by community members of the
function they serve, strengthening the privacy-protecting user's
basis for a subjective expectation of privacy.
What complicates the scenario for current purposes is the fact
that any given user can post photographs of other people.80 Thus,
while a subjective expectation of privacy in a photograph can be
hypothesized, the Katz inquiry into whether the subject has
76 See Hodge, supra note 2, at 110-11.
n See Lisa Guernsey, Picture Your Name Here, N.Y. TIMES, July 27, 2008,
Tech Support, at 6 (reporting one user's "picky" approach to establishing
friends), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/27/education/edlife
/27facebook-innovation.html (last visited Nov. 14, 2008).
78 See id ("De-tagging removing-your name from a Facebook photo-has
become an image-saving step"). As one student put it, "[t]he event happens,
pictures are up within 12 hours, and within another 12 hours people are de-
tagging." Id.
79 See Hodge, supra note 2, at 110 (noting that it is questionable whether
limiting profiles via privacy settings "will overcome the presumption that by
posting information on a profile, users cannot actually expect privacy because
they are sharing personal information in a style much like a bulletin board or a
yearbook").
80 Jim Saska, Facebook-the fall of privacy, THE DAILY PENNSYLVANIAN,
Mar. 31, 2008, http://media.www.dailypennsylvanian.com/media/storage/
paper882/news/2008/03/3 I/Opinion/Jim-Saksa.Facebook.The.Fall.Of.Privacy-
3292188.shtml (describing the unsettling situation where a student in the library
observed a complete stranger viewing photos of him that a friend had posted)
(last visited Nov. 14, 2008) (on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law &
Technology).
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"knowingly expose[d] [the photo] to the public"8' does not apply
neatly to the context of personal information being provided by
someone else. Here, both the content of the photograph and the
identity of the uploader become key considerations for the Katz
analysis. When a photograph's content reveals something blatant
and obvious or when the activity is being performed openly and
notoriously, it is easy to see how a subjective expectation of
privacy is not likely to attach. However, when the content of the
photograph is of a murky, questionable nature, or when the activity
is being performed in a clearly personal setting, a person may
logically hold a subjective expectation of privacy.
Furthermore, these expectations of privacy may operate at
different levels, owing to the varying levels of publicity which are
possible. To begin with, the subject of a highly private or intimate
photograph may never expect that such a photograph would be
uploaded onto a social networking website. Alternatively, a
pictured individual may expect the posting of a photograph, while
at the same time expecting that certain protections will reliably
secure his or her privacy interests. These protections could come
in concrete forms, such as the uploader posting photographs
without identifying the subject's name, the absence of link-creating
tags, or through the varying degrees of privacy available to online
photograph albums. 82  However, the protections could also be
more general. For example, before determining whether a
particular photo deserves an expectation of privacy (which is, most
of the time, not a fully conscious determination) the pictured
individual may consider the prototypical online behavior of the
uploader. This consideration could involve whether the uploader
generally posts a lot of photographs, tags every pictured individual
or just certain friends they know would approve of being tagged, or
makes lots of attention-drawing comments. Additionally, the
pictured individual would likely factor in the general composition
of the audience who will see the photographs (who is the uploader
friends with?) in formulating whether to place a privacy
81 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
82 See Guernsey, supra note 77 (citing Educause study showing "45 percent of
students who use social-networking sites put 'a lot' of restrictions on who can
see their profile; 41 percent put 'some' ").
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expectation in the photograph. Regardless of whether the
protections are concrete or more general, the photograph subject
may still subjectively expect the photograph to remain private,
even though he or she was not responsible for posting the
photograph to the online social network.
B. Objectively Reasonable Expectation ofPrivacy
Subjective privacy expectations of a given photograph subject
are not enough to protect that photograph from search and seizure.
"[T]he police may still take any measure without a warrant to
discover . . . information if society is not prepared to recognize an
expectation of privacy in that material." The ultimate question
thus boils down to this: is society prepared to recognize an
expectation of privacy belonging to the subject of a photograph
posted to an online social networking site by another user?84
Traditional notions of what is considered private in cyberspace
suggest that courts would answer this question in the negative.
However, given the practical realities of the social interactions on
networking sites and the reasonable anticipations guiding their
users, these notions must be adapted so that this question can be
answered affirmatively-at least in certain circumstances.
83 Hodge, supra note 2, at 112.
84 At least one country, Ireland, has enacted or interpreted law to recognize
such a privacy expectation. See Yes, you are a cyber criminal, THE POST.IE,
Nov. 16, 2008, http://www.thepost.ie/post/pages/p/story.aspx-qqqt-
TECHNOLOGY-qqqm=nav-qqqid= 37504-qqqx=1.asp ("Suppose you're out
and about and see a child frolicking in a fountain. Or perhaps a homeless man
painting a mural. Or even a newly-married couple kissing. It is against data
protection law to upload those images to your ... Facebook ... account[].
Those images are the personal data property of the subjects involved and explicit
permission must be attained prior to uploading them.") (last visited Nov. 16,
2008) (on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology).
85 See Hodge, supra note 2, at 113 (noting "the objective prong is a difficult
prong to overcome" in the cyberspace context due to the consistent position of
the Supreme Court that a person has no legitimate expectation of privacy in
information turned over to a third person).
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Finding such an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy
requires tossing out the abstract conceptions of cyberspace86 and
the awkward analogies to 20th Century objects and
communications that have shaped cyberspace privacy law.8 7  If
such devices ever did properly frame the issues, they no longer
match the reality of today. Instead, new conceptions must emerge
to recognize the electronic lives that members of society lead
today. For example, a traditional argument suggests that simply
"[b]y signing on to Facebook or MySpace and providing personal
information for others to see, a user is, in effect, not seeking to
preserve the information as private, but is instead making a choice
to publicize this information for others." But in light of the vast
use of online social networks and the type of historically private
information readily provided on user profiles,89 this is not
necessarily the case. Rather, it seems that society-or at least the
growing portion of society comprised by social network users-
has in many respects applied traditional privacy expectations to
online profile pages and social network users operate
accordingly. 90 These users trust their friends, their individual
86 Even the name "cyberspace" has, at least in part, "otherworldly"
connotations (suggestive of science fiction, even) that belie the very real role it
plays in life today.
87 See Hodge, supra note 2, at 101-06.
8 Id. at 106.
89 One user purports to have photographs on Facebook showing himself
urinating in public, wearing women's clothing, and "making out with an ugly
girl," along with numerous drinking escapades. Jim Saska, Facebook - the fall
of privacy, THE DAILY PENNSYLVANIAN, Mar. 31, 2008, http://media.www.
dailypennsylvanian.com/media/storage/paper882/news/2008/03/3 1/Opinion/Jim
-Saksa.Facebook.The.Fall.Of.Privacy-3292188.shtml (describing the unsettling
situation where a student in the library observed a complete stranger viewing
photos of him that a friend had posted) (last visited Nov. 14, 2008) (on file with
the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology).
90 For example, consider the quote of Robyn Backer, who, while a student at
Virginia Wesleyan College, described her approach to de-tagging: "If I'm
holding something I shouldn't be holding, I'll untag ... [a]nd if I'm making a
particularly ugly face, I'll untag myself. Anything really embarrassing, I'll
untag." Lisa Guernsey, Picture Your Name Here, N.Y. TIMES, July 27, 2008,
Tech Support at 6 (reporting one user's "picky" approach to establishing
friends), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/27/education/edlife/
27facebook-innovation.html (last visited Nov. 14, 2008). By de-tagging, Backer
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monitoring of their networks,91 their privacy settings92 _and,
through inaction, their government-to keep certain information
private.
In this sense, a user's online profile is in many ways similar to
a person's home. 93  On its face, or from an anachronistic
perspective, such a comparison might seem crude, but close
inspection reveals that the analogy provides a nuanced and leveled
approach to privacy in a cyberspace life. The two environments
provide close parallels with regard to human behavior and
expectations in the privacy context. 94  The most pertinent
similarities between a home and a user's online profile include:
(1) social and legal standards generally require permission for
indicates her desire to preserve the "embarrassing" photographs as private and is
not publishing the information for others. Furthermore, by not asking the
uploader to take the embarrassing photographs down, Backer evidences her
expectation that the photographs will remain sufficiently private, despite her
knowledge that they remain accessible to certain users (presumably ones she
would permit to view them).
9 Users employ vigilance as a privacy-protection strategy, monitoring what
information is being disseminated about them on Facebook to ensure their
privacy remains protected. See id. (quoting one user's advice: "'Stay on top of
it .. .and make sure you know who can see what"').
92 See id. (discussing a user attempt to secure privacy by limiting the viewers
of her photo albums to friends only, as well as excluding specific friends or
groups of friends from seeing photographs in which she is tagged).
93 One user termed his Facebook profile "a comfortable haven amidst the
sprawling, faceless Internet." Kai Stinchcombe, Facebook Privacy, THE
STANFORD DAILY ONLINE, Sept. 25, 2006, http://daily.stanford.edu/article/
2006/9/25/facebookPrivacy (emphasis added) (last visited Nov. 15, 2008) (on
file with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology).
94 These privacy expectations with respect to the online social profile were
dramatically revealed when Facebook introduced its news-feed feature and
experienced fierce and immediate backlash, due largely to the way that feature
represented a usurpation of user control over information users considered
private. See Associated Press, Facebook feature draws privacy concerns;
Backlash over alerts when personal profile pages changed by friends,
MsNBC.COM, Sept. 8, 2006, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/14728756/ (on file
with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology).
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entry and inspection;95 (2) friends and acquaintances can
reasonably be deemed to have open invitations96 while strangers97
and the government do not;98 (3) extra mechanisms exist to protect
against intruders; 99 and (4) in light of these general assumptions,
people willingly bare private facts about their lives, comfortable
such facts will not escape such a private space.' 00  The fact that
some of these private facts may be exposed via the photograph-
posting actions of another user is immaterial; the artificial
environment of online social communities creates a feeling of
sanctity that results in a pattern of user behavior that reflects true
expectations of privacy.1 In other words, online social network
9 At their most basic levels, both entities have a series of "barriers" to the
outside world. A home may be protected by gates or fences, an expanse of
private property that would require trespassing to cross, as well as lockable entry
points. Similarly, gaining access to a social networking profile may require user
membership at the outset (analogous to a gated community) as well as further
protective hurdles as established by limited-access privacy settings.
Additionally, the profile itself is subject to the sole control of its creator, as
secured by user-created passwords (similar to the security passwords that may
protect a home).
96 See Stinchcombe, supra note 93 ("Facebook ... create[s] a comfortable
place where users can feel safe sharing their information" and can control who
they share information with).
97 See Kim Hart, A Flashy Facebook Page, At A Cost To Privacy: Add-Ons to
Online Social Profiles Expose Personal Data to Strangers, WASH. POST, June
12, 2008, at Al (describing how a typical user views the ability of "20 guys
you've never met" to access information from one's profile as something that
"should be troubling to people"), available at http://www.washingtonpost
.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/06/11/AR2008061103759.html (last visited
Nov. 15, 2008) (on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology).
98 See John S. Wilson, MySpace, Your Space, or Our Space? New Frontiers
in Electronic Evidence, 86 OR. L. REv. 1201, 1235-36 (2007) (raising questions
as to the social and legal acceptability of law enforcement officers or
government agents simply logging-in to social networking sites, (or more
aggressively, posing as pseudo-friends) in order to procure evidence).
99 See id (speculating whether password protections and profile-access
limitations equate to traditional locks, which have been held to confer
reasonable expectations of privacy).
100 See Stinchcombe, supra note 93 (describing Facebook as "a comfortable,
safe place" where information is shared with a "small group" of peers).
101 See Nancy Hass, In Your Facebook.com, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 8, 2006,
Education Life Supplement at 4A, (quoting a college student expressing just this
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users expect friends and acquaintances to come in and look around
if the door is open 02-and users trust their friends to keep the
things they see to themselves, or at least within a discrete group. 103
Contrastingly, users generally do not contemplate that law
enforcement officers would be welcome to make themselves at
home without complying with constitutional guidelines. 04 It is
precisely this reflection that inspires users to form objectively
reasonable privacy expectations in certain circumstances.
Another traditional mechanism that suffers in the social-
networking, photograph-posting context is the method for
determining when an individual has effectively consented to
governmental searches. There are no Fourth Amendment
protections when an individual consents to a search, but
traditionally such "consent exceptions" have been given broad
latitude; thus, "when a person gives information to a third party,
the third party is sometimes said to have common authority over
the object of the search and can then give 'consent' to its usage by
the police."' 05  The applications of such a third-party consent
sentiment: "Facebook is part of an evolving dialogue .... One of the things
that's most fascinating about it is how it illuminates the changing nature of
public and private identity. This is new ground on every level. What people in
positions of power have to realize is that people my age have a completely
different attitude about what is fair game") (emphasis added), available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/01/08/education/edlife/facebooks.html (last
visited Nov. 14, 2008).
102 This notion is embedded in Facebook's core principles. See Facebook:
Privacy Policy, http://www.facebook.com/policy.php (emphasizing Facebook's
hallmark governing ideal-that "[y]ou should have control over your personal
information" and "[y]ou should have access over information others want to
share") (emphasis added) (last visited Nov. 16, 2008) (on file with the North
Carolina Journal of Law & Technology).
103 See Stinchcombe, supra note 93 ("We shouldn't always have to be looking
over our shoulder to feel comfortable in our own online community.") (emphasis
added).
'0 See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352 (1967) (noting that Fourth
Amendment protections apply to various environments, including business
offices, friends' apartments, taxicabs, and phone booths).
105 See Hodge, supra note 2, at 111. See also United States v. Matlock, 415
U.S. 164, 171 (1974) ("consent ... is not limited to proof that consent was given
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exception to a photograph posted on a social networking site does
not immediately or rationally follow. Technically, the third party
has been given access to such information, but it is not clear that
the third person has any sort of common authority over the
photograph itself. An additional consideration may involve
whether the pictured individual is tagged or not; one could view
such an action as an express manifestation of consent by the third-
party, while the withholding of such identifying information might
indicate the third party's unwillingness to give the government
permission to access the photo.
Likewise, the "plain view" doctrine, which states that "objects,
activities, or statements that [one] exposes to the 'plain view' of
outsiders are not 'protected' because no intention to keep them to
[oneself] has been exhibited,"' 06 fails in its direct application to
photographs posted to online social networks. The most fatal blow
to this argument stems from the fact that the photograph's poster,
not its subject, is responsible for the exposure. Nevertheless, other
weaknesses exist as well. The "plain view" doctrine is predicated
on the logic that police (or other government agents) do not have to
turn away or hide their eyes to information in their "plain view."1 07
However, what is considered "plain view" in social cyberspace is
not clear. It would seem logical that the one-step removal from the
actual physical setting of the photograph is enough to take it out of
"plain view" as the sweeping connotations of that phrase suggest.
But even if not, and the information is searchable without a
warrant, is the officer only allowed to look at the visible screen?
Can he or she click on links? The impossibility of answering these
and other unsettled and difficult questions with any sort of
consistency or reliability demonstrates the inadequacy of the "plain
view" doctrine insofar as it pertains to privacy guarantees that exist
in photographs posted to social networking sites. Moreover, the
tagged status of the pictured individual could prove vital; perhaps a
photograph subject who is tagged would be in the "plain view" of a
by the defendant, but may ... [exist where] permission to search was obtained
from a third party who possessed common authority over or other sufficient
relationship to the premises or effects sought to be inspected.").
1o6 Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
107 See Hodge, supra note 2, at 108.
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perusing law enforcement officer, but an unlabeled, unidentified
subject would not and any further searching to identify the
person's identity would be unwarranted.
As these traditional search and seizure constructs and
formulations inevitably fall victim to such shortfalls, a proper,
forward-thinking, practical-reality approach must arise. Such an
approach first requires analysis of whether the "communities"
created by social networks are themselves deemed public or
private. os These artificial online groupings can and do share
characteristics of both public and private bodies. 109 Additionally,
as Internet users become more and more comfortable sharing
information online, the distinctions between traditionally private
and public information become less definite and clear.' 10 While
traditional constructs view posting information online as
publication to the world, social network users are not irrational in
thinking they may have a reasonable privacy expectation when
they post limited information, or they intend to limit the
information, to select groups of people."' Certainly, given a
contextual framing of the online group involved (a group of
friends, an organization, an entire school, a community, etc.), it is
possible to imagine a scenario where sharing information between
these discrete users is not properly described as "publication" at
all, especially considering that term's historical meaning.112 Under
108 See generally Patricia G. Lange, Publicly Private and Privately Public:
Social Networking on YouTube, JOURNAL OF COMPUTER-MEDIATED COMMC'N,
13(1), ARTICLE 18 (2007), available at http://jcmc.indiana
.edu/voll3/issuel/lange.html (last visited Nov. 14, 2008) (on file with the North
Carolina Journal of Law & Technology); Danah Boyd, Social Networking Sites:
Public, Private, or What?" KNOWLEDGE TREE 13, May 2007, available at
http://kt.flexiblelearning.net.au/tkt2007/?pageid=28 (last visited Nov. 14, 2008)
(on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology).
'
09 See generally Lange, supra note 108.
o10 See John S. Wilson, MySpace, Your Space, or Our Space? New Frontiers
in Electronic Evidence, 86 OR. L. REv. 1201, 1233-36 (2007).
' See Hodge, supra note 2, at 106.
112 The Supreme Court of the United States has recognized the tendency for
privacy considerations to lag behind evolving social constructs fueled by
technological advancement, proclaiming that "[t]he law, though jealous of
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this theoretical construct, when users post photographs, they do not
"publicize" them; they merely allow a known and trusted private
group to view them. Eschewing rationalizations based on this
publication concept seems appropriate since the intended
recipients11 3 of information on online social networks differs
significantly from the audiences traditionally encompassed by
notions of "publication." In this sense, an analogy can be made
between social network user actions and the phone
communications held private in Katz. 114 However, rather than
simply involving the phone line transmissions from one individual
to another, as in Katz, a phone call to a friend where the contents of
the call remain private, despite being audible on the other end to a
group of common friends, provides a better analogy to the online
community situation. If accepted, a revamped construction such as
this would go a long way toward establishing the objective
reasonableness of privacy expectations in an online world.
On the other hand, as the number and the relative
sophistication of Internet users increase, photographs hosted on
social networking sites will become even more widely
accessible." 5 The logical conclusion is that courts will recognize
these photographs as public communication. Undoubtedly, the fact
that relevant parties such as law enforcement, school
administrators, opposing legal counsel, and even community
vigilantesll6 are actively seeking out such material" 7 could play a
individual privacy, has not kept pace with these advances in scientific
knowledge." Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 49 (1967).
113 See Hodge, supra note 2, at 114-15.
114 See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 359 (1967).
I's Or, following the discovery of such a photograph, the photograph could be
saved to the viewer's own drive and thus preserved for dissemination via
alternative means. Additionally, the photo could be cached on a server and
preserved there as well.
116 Jodie Sinnema, Facebook vigilantes identify alleged cat killers, CANWEST
NEWS SERVICE, CANADA.COM (VICTORIA TIMES-COLUMNIST), Jan. 7, 2008,
available at http://www.canada.com/victoriatimescolonist/news/story.html?id=
efaf5eb7-2741-4a06-a2ef-cba3dcfl8679&k=46162 (last visited Nov. 14, 2008)
(on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology). see also
Wilson, supra note 110, at 1226 ("Some people act as something akin to
'MySpace vigilantes,' using the site to ferret out potential sex abusers").
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substantial role in recognizing photographs as public
communcation. Still, even the collective awareness that people are
possibly searching the Internet to access an implicating photograph
does not automatically destroy privacy expectations. It is
objectively reasonable to expect that such people will not perform
searches unless given a reason or suspicion. Moreover, if a tag is
not present, a pictured individual may well have the expectation
that no compromise of his or her privacy occurred. Thus, social
networking sites in general and user profiles individually, may at
different times and with respect to different information be
classified as either public or private-and sometimes both
simultaneously.
Wrapped up in all these public and private considerations is the
actual photograph content, including the setting in which it was
taken. 8 Wholly apart from the photograph's eventual posting to
an online community, the very content of the photograph may be
enough to secure an objectively reasonable privacy expectation.
For example, if the photograph detailed highly personal
interactions or if a subject only granted consent to be photographed
upon express assurances of privacy, society would likely attach a
reasonable privacy expectation to such scenarios. These
expectations would extend to the unanticipated posting of the
photograph online, whether the subject is tagged or not.1 Related
to the photograph's content is its setting; society would be less
likely to extend privacy expectations to photographs taken in
117 See Nancy Hass, In Your Facebook.com, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 8, 2006,
Education Life Supplement at 4A, available at http://www.nytimes
.com/2006/01/08/education/edlife/facebooks.html (last visited Nov. 14, 2008).
118 See Patricia Sanchez Abril, Recasting Privacy Torts In A Spaceless World,
21 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 1, 41-44 (2007) (discussing reasonable expectations as
they pertain to possible audiences).
119 See Associated Press, Naked Photos, E-Mail Get Teens in Trouble,
FOXNEWS.COM, June 5, 2008, available at http://www.foxnews.com/story/
0,2933,363438,00.html (exposing the wrongness society feels toward private
photos being distributed online without authorization, a wrongness that
sometimes, in extreme settings, manifests itself in criminal sanctions) (last
visited Nov. 17, 2008) (on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law &
Technology).
N.C. J.L. & TECH.
indisputably public places (because no expectation of privacy
existed at the time of the photograph), than it would to a
photograph taken in a person's home 20 or another intimate setting.
Additionally, the number of people captured by the photograph,
their relationships to each other, and their subjective expectations
regarding the photograph could all influence whether an
objectively reasonable privacy expectation exists. Lastly, in
deciding the extent to which a photograph's content should
influence whether the photograph is objectively considered private
or public, the inquiry must focus on the intended audience of the
posted photograph.121
VI. CONCLUSION
Resolution of Fourth Amendment privacy protections in a
social networking world raises some challenging questions: (1) Is
it unreasonable to expect privacy in places where such an
expectation would have been completely warranted just ten years
ago?; (2) Is it fair to ask people to change their behavior in the face
of such rapid technological change?; (3) Does the emergence of
small, sophisticated, and mobile image-capturing devices paired
with the explosion of social networking expose new privacy risks
deserving of protection?; and (4) To what extent must law
enforcement standards change and adapt in light of these changes?
Faced with such a potent, landscape-changing threat to privacy
expectations, society must pin its resolution on whether the desired
remedy is best found in behavioral modification or in a legal
refuge of some sort, perhaps most logically within the confines of
the Fourth Amendment.
The simple emergence of social networking sites and the vast
dissemination of information that originates from them may have
already led to, and may continue to spur, a general reformulating
of what is considered "private" in the public conscience generally.
As users of these sites become accustomed to seeing, reading,
120 See Katz, 389 U.S. at 352 n.8.
121 See Abril, supra note 118, at 33 (2007) ("Instead of basing a privacy
assessment on its complete seclusion or secrecy, courts should analyze the
overall accessibility of the information in question").
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sharing, and hearing information that was not traditionally
communicated on such a large scale, either out of privacy concerns
or simple logistical constraints, it is only natural that a "loosening"
or "re-orienting" of the standard for what is truly private could
occur. Alternatively, given the increasing possibility for negative
consequences resulting from online activities,122 social network
users could come to sense and expect heightened privacy
entitlements in certain types or categories of content. Thus, for
example, with regard to photographs depicting friends at a small
house party, a collective social understanding could emerge that
such content, even when posted online, is of the type that the
public eye should never see.
In fact, it is quite easy to see how the posting of such
photographs (whether or not exposed to prosecutorial forces) could
have such reasonable privacy expectations attached that society
would deem the photographs protected.123 Clamoring for some
sort of recognition is the seemingly evolving collective sense that
some wrong may occur when "'what is whispered in the closet
shall be proclaimed from the house-tops,"' 24 or adapted to modern
times, when what is photographed in intimacy could be accessible
by police laptops. With severe and drastic consequencesl 25
stemming from such publication, recognition of Fourth
Amendment protections inhering in such photos is perhaps
overdue.
Current constructs of privacy law do not prove adept at
adequately protecting sensible notions of privacy expectations.
Something must give. Common sense suggests that drastic
behavioral changes are unlikely and that the unabated explosion of
social networking websites will likely lead to the development of
122 See generally Hass, supra note 117.
123 The privacy interest at issue here might best be conceptualized as that
which "enforces socially-accepted codes of civility between members of a
community and safeguards intimacy and social ties." Abril, supra note 118, at
33.
124 Samuel D. Warren & Lewis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L.
REv. 193, 195 (1890) (source of internal quotation not cited in original).
125 See generally Hass, supra note 117.
N.C. J.L. & TECH.
even more privacy conflicts.126  Consequently, it becomes
necessary to either reshape how society views privacy in the online
social networking context or the constructs themselves must evolve
to better envelop those actions which appear in conflict with
contemporary notions of privacy entitlements.' 2 7 In the search-
and-seizure context, any existing legal protections would seem to
find their most logical home in the Fourth Amendment, though the
case-by-case determinations required could make such an approach
undesirable in practice. Even in the event that such guarantees are
not established judicially through the operation-or newfangled
recognition--of cyberspace privacy rights, the evolving social
dynamics presented by social networking sites recommend the
development of some mechanism for protecting privacy online.
Such protection could be achieved judicially, legislatively, or via
common law tort adaptations, but it seems clear that as society
increasingly transfers many of its substantive activities from the
concrete physical world to the artificial online world, the law must
simultaneously evolve to protect certain privacy entitlements as
they exist in their new environments.
126 See, e.g., id (quoting a school official who referred to "Facebook as a land
mine.").
127 See generally Abril, supra note 118, at 27-47 (positing, in the context of
tort law, an interesting and compelling new framework tailored to today's online
world for determining whether a disclosure of information is legally protected.
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